b) In the event that a future general maritime restriction treaty does not apply the method of restriction by agreed relations between fleets of different powers, the German Government would not insist on the inclusion in such a future general treaty of the relationship covered in paragraph 2, provided that the method used to limit sea armament in the future gives Germany full guarantees that this relationship can be maintained. At a cabinet meeting on 3 May 1939, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Stanhope, stated that “Germany was building ships as quickly as possible at this stage, but would not be able to exceed the quota of 35 per cent until 1942 or 1943.”  Chatfield, now Defence Minister, said Hitler had “convinced” himself that the UK had given the UK a “carte blanche” in Eastern Europe in exchange for the deal.  Chamberlain stated that the United Kingdom had never shown such understanding to Germany, and he noted that, when he met the Fuhrer at the Berchtesgaden Summit in September 1938, he had for the first time been aware of Hitler`s faith in such an unspoken agreement.  In a later document to the cabinet, Chatfield stated that “we could say that we understood now that Mr. Hitler had thought in 1935 that we had given him carte blanche in Central and Eastern Europe, in exchange for his acceptance of the 100:35 report, but as we could not accept the correctness of that opinion. , it would be better if the 1935 agreements were cancelled.”  The origins of the agreement lie in the discussions that Sir John Simon and Chancellor Hitler had in Berlin on 25 and 26 March. Hitler, who ignored the objections of the Wilhelmstrasse, suggested to his visitor that Germany, through a bilateral agreement, recognize the Sea of Great Britain, while remaining satisfied with a maritime power equivalent to that of France (an expression used) or a third of that of the British one. The leader was immediately informed of the inconsistency of this proposal. The French fleet was half the size of the British fleet; As a result, the German navy could hardly be compared to that of France and remains a third of the British navy. In his famous speech on 21 May, Hitler expressed his assertions more precisely: the German navy should be 35 per cent lower than the English, 15% less than the French.
“The German government,” Hitler added, “voluntarily recognizes the greatest vital importance and therefore the justification for the dominant maritime protection of the British Empire, just as we are determined to do whatever is necessary to protect our existence and freedom on the continent. The German government intends to do everything in its power to establish and maintain such relations with the British people and state, which would forever prevent the recurrence of the only war that has taken place so far between the two nations. On June 2, 1935, Ribbentrop arrived in London. The talks began on Tuesday, June 4, 1935 at the Admiralty office with Ribbentrop at the head of the German delegation and Simon of the British delegation.  Ribbentrop, determined to succeed in his mission, began his discussions by saying that Britain could accept the 35:100 report until the weekend as “fixed and immutable”, or the German delegation would return home, and the Germans would build their navy in all desired sizes.   Simon was visibly annoyed by Ribbentrop`s behaviour: “It is not common to set such conditions at the beginning of negotiations.”